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APPRECIATING MANDATORY RULES: 
A REPLY TO CRITICS 
Scott Dodson* 
It seems that few are pleased with the Court’s recent decision in 
Bowles v. Russell, in which the Court held the time limit for filing a notice 
of appeal to be jurisdictional and therefore not susceptible to the unique cir-
cumstances doctrine.1  As I wrote in my original Essay, I believe the Court 
disrupted prior precedent and missed a golden opportunity to develop, in a 
principled way, a framework for characterizing rules as jurisdictional or 
not,2 and I adhere to those views.   
Three have responded to my Essay.  Professor Perry Dane criticizes 
Bowles for failing to appreciate that jurisdictional rules—assuming the 
deadline to file a notice of appeal is in fact jurisdictional—need not lead in-
exorably to a rigid application.3  Mr. E. King Poor, Esq., defends Bowles as 
rightly decided and also as a good result.4  And, Professor Beth Burch criti-
cizes Bowles for some of the same reasons I do, but she goes further to sug-
gest that the Court (and I) failed to give sufficient recognition to the equity 
appeal of the case.5  It is appropriate for me to provide a brief reply to those 
who have joined me in this debate.   
 
*  Assistant Professor, University of Arkansas School of Law.  I am indebted to Beth Burch, Perry 
Dane, King Poor, Philip Pucillo, and Howard Wasserman for reviewing and commenting on earlier 
drafts. 
1  127 S. Ct. 2360 (2007) (link). 
2  Scott Dodson, Jurisdictionality and Bowles v. Russell, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 42 (2007), 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2007/21/ (link) [hereinafter Dodson, Jurisdiction-
ality]; cf. Scott Dodson, In Search of Removal Jurisdiction, 102 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) 
[hereinafter Dodson, Removal Jurisdiction] (setting forth such a framework). 
3  Perry Dane, Sad Time: Thoughts on Jurisdictionality, the Legal Imagination, and Bowles v. Rus-
sell, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 164, 167 (2008), 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/Colloquy/2008/2/ (link). 
4  E. King Poor, The Jurisdictional Time Limit for an Appeal: The Worst Kind of Deadline—Except 
for All Others, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 151, 152 (2008), 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/Colloquy/2008/1/ (link). 
5  Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Nonjurisdictionality or Inequity, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 64, 
65 (2007), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2007/24/ (link). 
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I. A REPLY TO PROFESSOR DANE 
I am sympathetic to Professor Dane’s argument that a jurisdictional 
rule need not necessarily be applied rigidly.6  I would go further, however, 
and explore—in a very preliminary way—three different strands that, while 
not necessarily entirely distinct from each other, capture different aspects of 
the role flexibility may play in jurisdictionality. 
First, a rule could be jurisdictional without implicating a court’s sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction and therefore could lack some attributes of jurisdic-
tionality even if subject-matter jurisdiction remains rigid and inviolate.  
Rules of personal jurisdiction, for example, can be waived,7 as can the ju-
risdictional-in-nature doctrine of state sovereign immunity.8  If the abso-
luteness of jurisdictionality may be relaxed in these jurisdictional rules 
through consent and waiver, perhaps it might also be relaxed in other ways 
or in other jurisdictional doctrines that do not implicate subject-matter ju-
risdiction. 
Second, a jurisdictional rule could be applied inflexibly but the pre-
conditions giving rise to the rule could not.  Professor Dane alludes to one 
such example, the “final judgment rule,” which precludes appellate jurisdic-
tion absent a “final” judgment.9  The rule is jurisdictional, but the existence 
of a final judgment is a precondition that may be susceptible to flexibility in 
its determination.  An analogous example closer to home might be the re-
quirement to file a notice of appeal before appellate jurisdiction will attach.  
A notice might be jurisdictionally required, but what constitutes such notice 
might be subject to some discretion by a court.10 
Third, a rule could be jurisdictional yet also, as a result of drafter in-
tent, allow for flexibility.  In some respects, the time to appeal fits into this 
category.  Section 2107(c) allows the court to extend the time to appeal ret-
roactively for equitable reasons.11  Professor Dane proposes another exam-
 
6  Dane, supra note 3, at 167. 
7  See Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702–03 (1982) 
(link); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(1).  
8  See Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883) (link); see also Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. 
Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 620 (2002) (link) (holding that a state’s voluntary removal to federal court 
waives Eleventh Amendment immunity). 
9  Dane, supra note 3, at 167. 
10  Mark A. Hall, The Jurisdictional Nature of the Time to Appeal, 21 GA. L. REV. 399, 410 (1986) 
(“[N]otice of appeal timing limitations simply impose a mandatory precondition to acquiring appellate 
jurisdiction, no different in kind . . . from the precondition to original jurisdiction that the plaintiff file a 
technically correct complaint stating a cause of action within the statute of limitations.”); cf. United 
States v. Cos, 498 F.3d 1115, 1123 (2007) (holding that although the time to appeal might be jurisdic-
tional, the determination of when that time began to run is not); cf. also Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 
245 (1992) (link) (holding an appellate brief to constitute a notice of appeal for purpose of the timely 
notice of appeal requirement); Haney v. Mizell Mem’l Hosp., 744 F.2d 1467, 1472 n.3 (11th Cir. 1984) 
(stating that Rule 4(a) is not itself jurisdictional but instead is a “mandatory prerequisite to the exercise 
of appellate jurisdiction”). 
11  28 U.S.C. § 2107(c) (2000) (link). 
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ple: Congress could not have intended the courts to enforce rigidly the time 
limit to file a petition for certiorari in the face of an unforeseen snowstorm 
that unreasonably delayed a petition.12  In other words, Congress might 
make a rule jurisdictional yet also intend it to be subject to some flexibility 
in application. 
It seems to me that Professor Dane focuses on the third category in cri-
tiquing Bowles, but I think the other categories might have something to of-
fer as well.  For example, perhaps appellate jurisdiction is not subject-
matter jurisdiction at all but instead is a breed of jurisdiction—like personal 
jurisdiction—that need not be applied so rigidly.  Or, perhaps appellate ju-
risdiction is subject-matter jurisdiction, but the precondition of a timely no-
tice of appeal is a fact amenable to a degree of equity or flexibility. 
My point is that I think Professor Dane is on to something, something 
that needs further thought and discussion.  And therefore I join him in ex-
pressing sadness that the Court continues to miss opportunities to provide 
just that.13 
II. A REPLY TO MR. POOR 
Professor Dane’s position that a rule could be jurisdictional yet provide 
some flexibility undermines Mr. Poor’s defense of Bowles even were Mr. 
Poor correct that the rule is properly characterized as jurisdictional.  But be-
cause my original Essay took the nonjurisdictional path at the Bowles fork 
rather than the jurisdictional path, I will reply to Mr. Poor from that per-
spective. 
Mr. Poor defends Bowles on two grounds.  First, he agrees with the 
Court that the deadline to file a notice of appeal “has always been deemed 
to be ‘jurisdictional.’”14  Second, he suggests that a jurisdictional charac-
terization promotes “greater stability and overall fairness.”15  I will com-
ment on each. 
First, the Supreme Court’s historical treatment of the time to file a no-
tice of appeal in a civil case has not been as clear or consistent as either 
Bowles or Mr. Poor makes it seem.  Bowles relied on six cases as evidence 
of a “longstanding treatment” of the time to file an appeal as jurisdictional.  
But, two of those cases did not address the time to appeal and instead held 
appellate jurisdiction lacking when no notice of appeal had been filed at 
 
12  Dane, supra note 3, at 167–68 (discussing Teague v. Comm’r of Customs, 394 U.S. 977 (1969)). 
13  The most recent example is John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 750 (2008) 
(link), in which the Court again neglected to take serious stock of its jurisdictionality jurisprudence and 
instead relied on stare decisis to characterize a statutory deadline, id. at 756, though elsewhere I have 
argued that the case may hold some silver lining on this issue.  See Posting of Scott Dodson to Civil 
Procedure Prof Blog, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/civpro/2008/01/dodson-three-mu.html (Jan. 8, 
2008) (link). 
14  Poor, supra note 4, at 151. 
15  Id. at 151–52. 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2008/7/ 230 
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW COLLOQUY 
all.16  A third dealt with an issue of Supreme Court jurisdiction—rather than 
appellate jurisdiction—and referenced the time to file a notice of appeal by 
way of analogy only.17   
The other three cases did resolve the consequence of an untimely filing 
of a notice of appeal, but none of them recognized any justification for a ju-
risdictional characterization as opposed to a mandatory characterization.  
Indeed, two of the three dealt specifically with the ability of a court to ex-
cuse untimely filings for equitable reasons when the appellee properly 
raised the timeliness issue—a quintessential issue only relevant if the rule is 
mandatory rather than jurisdictional.18  The last, Scarborough v. Pargoud,19 
resolves the issue summarily and without detailed explanation; it is unclear 
whether the appellee objected or timely moved to dismiss the appeal.20  In 
addition, as a case that predated the creation of the courts of appeals (and, 
by necessity, 28 U.S.C. § 2107), it only addressed an appeal from a district 
court to the Supreme Court. 
Mr. Poor adds six other cases that Bowles did not rely upon,21 but these 
additions do not help his (or the Court’s) case.  Four of the six do not ad-
dress the character of the deadline to file a notice of appeal in a civil case.22  
A fifth does mention the time to file a notice of appeal, but only in a passing 
footnote, and nothing in the case turned on the characterization.23  Only one 
 
16  Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 314 (1988) (link) (holding that the failure to 
specify a party in the notice of appeal constitutes a failure of that party to appeal at all); Griggs v. Provi-
dent Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 60–61 (1982) (link) (per curiam) (holding that the filing of a pre-
mature notice of appeal nullifies it and constitutes a failure to file any notice of appeal). 
17  Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 246–47 (1998) (link). 
18  United States v. Curry, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 106, 109, 113 (1848) (link) (dismissing the appeal on 
the motion of the appellee notwithstanding the appellant’s arguments for equitable leniency); Browder v. 
Dep’t of Corr. of Ill., 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978) (link) (same). 
19  108 U.S. 567 (1883) (link). 
20  Id. at 567–68 (summarily dismissing an appeal without elaborating why the rule was jurisdic-
tional rather than mandatory). 
21  Poor, supra note 4, at 154 n.16. 
22  Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co. addressed when a judgment becomes final, not whether the 
time limit accruing after that event occurs is jurisdictional, and in any case, the appellee timely moved to 
dismiss the appeal on untimeliness grounds.  486 U.S. 196, 197, 199 (1988) (link).  Old Nick Williams 
Co. v. United States addressed the characterization of an appeal from a criminal, not a civil, case, and in 
any case, the respondent timely moved to dismiss the writ of error based on the untimely appeal.  215 
U.S. 541, 541–42 (1910) (link).  Similarly, United States v. Robinson, which Mr. Poor repeatedly cites, 
see Poor, supra note 4, at 154 nn.16 & 18; id. at 155 n.24, characterized the time limit for filing a crimi-
nal (not a civil) appeal as “mandatory and jurisdictional,” 361 U.S. 220, 229 (1960) (link), but the nar-
row issue presented was whether the deadline was mandatory.  Regardless, the Court’s “mandatory and 
jurisdictional” characterization has since been corrected by a unanimous Supreme Court as mandatory 
but nonjurisdictional.  Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 17–18 (2005) (link) (per curiam).  Finally, 
Edmonson v. Bloomshire confronted an appeal that was timely filed and therefore valid; the defect at 
issue was the appellant’s failure to transmit the record in a timely manner.  74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 306, 307, 
311 (1868) (link). 
23  Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 159 n.6 (2003) (link) (addressing a question of 
statutory interpretation under the Coal Act).   
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of the six cases, Credit Co. v. Arkansas Central Railway Co.,24 actually ap-
pears to confront an untimely civil notice of appeal; but, like Scarborough, 
its reasoning is sparse, its procedural history is unclear, and it antedated the 
creation of the courts of appeals.25 
In short, neither Bowles nor Mr. Poor has pointed to a single Supreme 
Court decision holding that the deadline to file a notice of appeal in a civil 
case must be enforced over the appellant’s consent, waiver, or forfeiture.26  
In the cases cited, the Court’s characterizations of the deadline as jurisdic-
tional, as opposed to mandatory, are either dicta or products of a careless 
use of the term “jurisdictional.”27  They provide no rational reason to ele-
vate the deadline’s status above “mandatory” to “jurisdictional.”  And, 
unlike more recent cases, they give no serious thought to what jurisdiction 
means and how to determine it in a broader context.  As a result, in my 
view, they deserve less deference than Mr. Poor would give them.28 
In light of that, it would not have been out of line for Bowles to take 
the more cautious, and narrower, approach of characterizing the deadline as 
mandatory rather than jurisdictional.  Indeed, in several previous instances, 
the Court has dispensed with long traditions of calling deadlines jurisdic-
 
24  128 U.S. 258 (1888) (link).   
25  Id. at 258. 
26  Mr. Poor alludes to “thousands” of lower federal court decisions holding the rule to be jurisdic-
tional as well.  Poor, supra note 4, at 154.  I have not reviewed each case, so I cannot say whether any 
decision actually addressed the distinction between a mandatory characterization and a jurisdictional 
characterization in a thoughtful and reasoned way.  But I doubt it.  Lower courts take their cues from the 
Supreme Court, and if the Supreme Court used the term “jurisdictional,” they are likely to follow it, 
even if the Supreme Court’s use was careless and unthinking.  Mr. Poor’s own citation supports this.  He 
finds over 1,300 cases that cited United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220 (1960) (link), and mentioned 
the jurisdictional status of a deadline or time period.  But Robinson’s jurisdictional characterization of 
Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure has been disavowed by the Supreme Court.  See 
Eberhart, 546 U.S. at 17–18.  All that those 1,300 cases have done is compound Robinson’s error.   
27  This careless use of the term has been recognized recently and repeatedly by the Court.  See Si-
nochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1184, 1193 (2007) (link) (admitting that 
phrases from prior precedent using the term “jurisdiction” were “less than ‘felicitously’ crafted”); Ar-
baugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 510 (2006) (link) (confessing that courts had “sometimes been prof-
ligate in [their] use of the term [jurisdictional]”); Eberhart, 546 U.S. at 19 (noting that the lower court’s 
improper characterization of a federal rule as jurisdictional “is an error shared among the circuits, and 
that it was caused in large part by imprecision in our prior cases”); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 454 
(2004) (link) (“Courts, including this Court, it is true, have been less than meticulous . . . ; they have 
more than occasionally used the term ‘jurisdictional’ to describe emphatic time prescriptions in rules of 
court.”).  
28  My original Essay did not “overlook[]” the historical treatment of the deadline to file a notice of 
appeal.  Poor, supra note 4, at 153.  Rather, I argued that adhering to that treatment in the face of recent 
precedent trending away from a jurisdictional characterization caused doctrinal inconsistency, particu-
larly because Bowles’s rationale for distinguishing the more recent precedent is weak.  Dodson, Jurisdic-
tionality, supra note 2, at 43–45.  For a more comprehensive argument that Bowles’s distinction between 
statutory rules and non-statutory rules is logically flawed, see Scott Dodson, The Failure of Bowles v. 
Russell, 43 TULSA L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript on file with author), available at 
http://works.bepress.com/scott_dodson/17/ (link).   
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tional when the cases forming that tradition did not turn on such a charac-
terization.29  In addition, the Court also has recognized the value of deciding 
the narrower issue of whether a rule is mandatory rather than the broader is-
sue of whether the rule is also jurisdictional.30  What all of this means is that 
Bowles’s heavy, even dispositive, reliance on a “longstanding tradition,” 
without other reasons for characterizing the deadline as jurisdictional, was 
unwarranted. 
This is not to say that a longstanding historical treatment has no place 
in the characterization inquiry.  Indeed, elsewhere, I have argued that it 
does have a place.31  But it is only one factor in a more nuanced analysis of 
several important factors relevant to jurisdictional characterization issues.  
To be clear, I am not arguing that federal courts have not used, for many 
years, the term “jurisdictional” to describe the deadline to file a notice of 
appeal.  Rather, my point is that this historical treatment, upon closer in-
spection, has holes and has been undermined by subsequent and more cir-
cumspect decisions on jurisdictional issues.  As a result, I think the Court 
would have been wise to avoid characterizing the rule as jurisdictional 
solely because of its historical tradition.  The more circumspect route would 
have been to address only the narrower issue before it—whether the rule 
was mandatory.  At the very least, if forced to determine the jurisdictional-
ity of the deadline, the Court should have considered a more nuanced ap-
proach than rote reliance on historical pedigree. 
Second, the sole policy justification that Mr. Poor relies upon to sup-
port a jurisdictional characterization over a mandatory characterization—
finality32—does not strongly support his case, and in any event, is out-
weighed by other factors.   
Mr. Poor says that a nonjurisdictional characterization would transform 
the time limit into “nothing more than a ‘helpful hint’ that could be ignored 
when convenient.”33  He fears that “the parties could hold it in abeyance for 
 
29  See, e.g., Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 512 (refusing to follow decisions characterizing Title VII’s defini-
tional section as jurisdictional because the “decision did not turn on that characterization, and the parties 
did not cross swords over it”); Eberhart, 546 U.S. at 17–18 (interpreting the phrase “mandatory and ju-
risdictional” as used in United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 228–29 (1960) (link), as “emphatically 
mandatory”); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998) (link) (declining to follow 
a decision characterizing a limit as jurisdictional because the case did not turn on it); Zipes v. Trans 
World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 395 (1982) (link) (dispensing with a long line of cases treating the 
deadline for filing a Title VII suit as jurisdictional when the precise holdings of precedent did not turn 
on that characterization). 
30  Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 31 (1989) (link); cf. John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. 
United States, 128 S. Ct. 750, 753–54 (2008) (link) (declining to address the jurisdictionality of the limi-
tations period of the Tucker Act and instead addressing the narrow issue presented by the facts, namely, 
whether a court of appeals could raise noncompliance sua sponte despite the government’s waiver of the 
issue in the lower courts). 
31  See Dodson, Removal Jurisdiction, supra note 2, Part III(D)(1). 
32  Poor, supra note 4, at 156. 
33  Id. at 158. 
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months or even years, if for instance, they were discussing settlement.”34  
But what is wrong with that?  Convenience and settlement seem like posi-
tive values to me.  In addition, these features exist in countless other non-
jurisdictional deadlines and judicial limits, for which courts have long 
allowed waiver and consent despite their effects on finality.35  Even statutes 
of limitations, a close analogue to the deadline to file a notice of appeal, are 
subject to waiver, even though they promote values (among others) unre-
lated to the interests of the parties.36 
I concede that the ability of a party to waive or forfeit a timeliness ob-
jection may give rise to odd incidences of satellite litigation, as illustrated 
by Mr. Poor’s “Hypothetical 2.”37  But these incidences should be rare in-
deed, for only the most incompetent attorney would unwittingly forfeit his 
objection to the timeliness of a notice of appeal.38  The vast majority of fail-
ures to object would be intentional and strategic, and thus unlikely to give 
rise to satellite litigation.  And even in the case of an unwitting forfeiture, 
the appellee may still prefer to litigate the merits rather than the satellite is-
sue of timeliness.  Finally, the likelihood of extensive satellite litigation is 
particularly low in these cases, for the end result is likely to be a swift and 
conclusive resolution by the appellate court, coupled with a published re-
buke to the attorney for failing to heed the mandatory nature of the rule.39 
Compared to the relatively low costs of allowing waiver and forfeiture, 
the benefits are far greater.  Most waivers and forfeitures would inure to the 
benefit of the parties and the judicial system.  Perhaps the parties wish to 
have uninterrupted time to settle yet be able to preserve their right to appeal 
(something to be encouraged, in my view).40  Perhaps the appellee agrees to 
an extension in exchange for some concession by the appellant that helps 
streamline the appeal or litigation as a whole.  Perhaps the appellant is a 
 
34  Id. 
35  See, e.g., Eberhart, 546 U.S. at 19 (“Rule 33, like Rule 29 and Bankruptcy Rule 4004, is a claim-
processing rule—one that is admittedly inflexible because of Rule 45(b)’s insistent demand for a definite 
end to proceedings.  These claim-processing rules thus assure relief to a party properly raising them, but 
do not compel the same result if the party forfeits them.”). 
36  See Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 205 (2006) (link). 
37  Poor, supra note 4, at 159. 
38  Mr. Poor’s own examples seem particularly implausible.  Id. at 159–160.  The failure to obtain 
written consent from an adversary before intentionally missing a deadline, as in Hypothetical 2, and the 
failure to assert a known right when directly asked to assert it, as in Hypothetical 5, are omissions that 
verge on malpractice. 
39  Cf. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 77–78 (1996) (link) (“The well-advised defendant, we 
are satisfied, will foresee the likely outcome of an unwarranted removal—a swift and nonreviewable 
remand order, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1447(c), (d) (link), attended by the displeasure of a district court whose 
authority has been improperly invoked.  The odds against any gain from a wrongful removal, in sum, 
render improbable Lewis’ projection of increased resort to the maneuver.”). 
40  Mr Poor actually makes this point himself, though he appears to find it an unwelcome develop-
ment.  Poor, supra note 4, at 158 n.34 (citing Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 
53, 55–58 (2d Cir. 1997)). 
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few days late but both parties would prefer to litigate the merits of the ap-
peal rather than the timeliness issue.  It seems to me far more likely that the 
benefits of a mandatory characterization outweigh the slight risk of satellite 
litigation. 
And, as I argued in my original Essay, Mr. Poor’s jurisdictional char-
acterization is not without its warts.  It obligates every circuit judge in every 
appeal to monitor and raise any questions about timeliness.  If a timeliness 
issue slips through the cracks, the entire appeal could be dismissed after full 
briefing and argument on the merits, even if neither party or the affected 
third parties wish for such a result.  And, finally, if one party does recognize 
the defect but the other party does not, the party that recognizes it (even if 
she is the tardy appellant!) can hold that ace up her sleeve and either win on 
the merits and never play it, or lose on the merits and play it on a motion for 
rehearing, essentially gaining two bites at the apple.41 
Therefore, I am skeptical of Mr. Poor’s assertion that “experience has 
taught that [a nonjurisdictional characterization] would, over the long term, 
engender far more instability, expense, delay, and ultimately unfairness.”42  
Empirical evidence may prove me wrong, but it is hard to see how a juris-
dictional characterization is more stable, less costly, and fairer than a man-
datory characterization. 
III. A REPLY TO PROFESSOR BURCH 
Professor Burch agrees that the deadline is nonjurisdictional but fears 
that a mandatory characterization of the rule is too harsh and too insensitive 
to the needs of equity in this case.43  She argues that the deadline must take 
equity into consideration as a matter of procedural justice in appeals.44 
I do not disagree that procedural justice should be an important consid-
eration for a judge confronted with a characterization issue.  And I am sym-
pathetic to the inequities of Mr. Bowles’s difficult position.  After all, the 
point of my original Essay was not to suggest that a mandatory characteri-
zation was correct; rather, it was to point out that a mandatory characteriza-
tion, as opposed to a jurisdictional characterization, had the salutary 
benefits of better conserving litigant and judicial resources and of being 
more compatible with precedent. 
I do, however, believe that considerations of fairness cannot be the 
only—or even necessarily the most important—factor for courts confronted 
with characterization issues.  Just as considerations of a “longstanding 
treatment” cannot be taken alone, so notions of fairness must be balanced 
 
41  Dodson, Jurisdictionality, supra note 2, at 46. 
42  Poor, supra note 4, at 162. 
43  Burch, supra note 5, at 65 (“[T]his nonjurisdictional alternative makes sense.  It is the ‘manda-
tory’ aspect of Professor Dodson’s proposal that concerns me; it leaves no room for equity absent the 
mercy of opposing counsel.”). 
44  Id. at 67–69. 
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against other important considerations—efficiency, cost-effectiveness, liti-
gant autonomy, and predictability are but a few45—that do not necessarily 
require the availability of equity, and, in some cases, might counsel against 
it.  In short, the possibility of unfair and inequitable results from a rigid ap-
plication of the rule is a consideration in determining whether to character-
ize the rule as mandatory, but it is not the only consideration and it may be 
outweighed by other factors.  Professor Burch’s focus on equity is under-
standable, is important, and ultimately may be convincing.  But operating in 
isolation, a focus on equity frustrates the larger project of making difficult 
characterization determinations more principled and holistic. 
Professor Burch kindly does not (though it would be appropriate for 
her to) criticize me for failing to explain what that larger project might look 
like.  After all, if I am going to suggest that fairness and equity might not 
control in this case, I ought at least to explain why. 
So let me, in a preliminary manner, sketch out what I view as the 
strongest arguments supporting a mandatory characterization.  These should 
be weighed against the benefits of the availability of equity. 
First, the text of the statute provides strong countervailing reasons 
against Professor Burch’s view.  Congress used the words “no appeal shall 
[be brought] . . . unless notice of appeal is [timely] filed.”46  The word 
“shall” may not be so mandatory as the phrase “without exception,” particu-
larly in light of the interpretative canon that Congress presumptively legis-
lates against a backdrop of equity,47 but most courts nevertheless have 
construed “shall” to mean mandatory.48  In addition, Congress expressly 
provided specific and detailed exceptions and a strict time limit for raising 
excusable neglect or good cause.49  Congress’s deliberate choices here sug-
 
45  Dodson, Jurisdictionality, supra note 2, at 47. 
46  28 U.S.C. § 2107(a) (2000) (link). 
47  See Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990) (link) (“Time requirements in law-
suits between private litigants are customarily subject to ‘equitable tolling.’”); Day v. McDonough, 547 
U.S. 198, 213 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“By imposing an unqualified ‘period of limitation’ against 
the background understanding that a defense of ‘limitations’ must be raised in the answer, the statute 
implies that the usual forfeiture rule is applicable.”). 
48  See, e.g., Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 35 (1998) (link) 
(stating that “the mandatory ‘shall’ . . . normally creates an obligation impervious to judicial discre-
tion”).  Of course, there are cases suggesting the opposite as well.  See, e.g., Gutierrez de Martinez v. 
Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 432–33 n.9 (1995) (link) (“Though ‘shall’ generally means ‘must,’ legal writers 
sometimes use, or misuse, ‘shall’ to mean ‘should,’ ‘will,’ or even ‘may.’”); Nat’l Ass’n of Home 
Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518, 2548 & n.12 (2007) (link) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“[O]ur analysis should not end simply because a statute uses the word ‘shall.’  Instead, we must look 
more closely at its listed criteria to determine whether they allow for discretion, despite the use of 
‘shall.’  After all, . . . a federal statute using the word ‘shall’ will sometimes allow room for discre-
tion.”); United Hosp. Ctr. v. Richardson, 757 F.2d 1445, 1453 (4th Cir. 1985) (stating that “in a proper 
case ‘shall’ may properly be construed as permissive”); B. GARNER, DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL 
USAGE 939 (2d ed. 1995) (“[C]ourts in virtually every English-speaking jurisdiction have held—by ne-
cessity—that shall means may in some contexts, and vice versa.”). 
49  28 U.S.C. § 2107(c) (link).  
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gest that it meant to restrict judicial discretion outside of these particular pa-
rameters.50 
Second, cases interpreting time limits for filing notices of appeal con-
sistently have held them to be mandatory.51  There is good reason to ques-
tion Bowles’s characterization of the precedent as supporting a 
jurisdictional characterization, but the precedent is far firmer as to the rule’s 
mandatory character.  Allowing equitable excuses at this stage risks doing 
even more violence to existing precedent than the jurisdictional characteri-
zation of Bowles does. 
Third, the values of fairness and equity must be considered in light of 
competing values such as efficiency, predictability, and finality.  For exam-
ple, the deadline to appeal, by discouraging old and stale appeals, ensures 
some modicum of finality to both the litigants and the courts and encour-
ages the parties to pursue appeals with alacrity.52  I question whether these 
values outweigh the strong equitable appeal of Keith Bowles’s case, but, at 
the very least, they mitigate it. 
I will not evaluate these arguments against the need for equity here—
ultimately, Professor Burch’s position may have the better of it.53  I mean 
only to show that arguments for equity must overcome more than just the 
need for it. 
 
50  See, e.g., United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 48–49 (1998) (link) (internal citations omitted) 
(“Equitable tolling is not permissible where it is inconsistent with the text of the relevant statute.  Here, 
the QTA, by providing that the statute of limitations will not begin to run until the plaintiff ‘knew or 
should have known of the claim of the United States,’ has already effectively allowed for equitable toll-
ing . . . . Given this fact, and the unusually generous nature of the QTA’s limitations time period, exten-
sion of the statutory period by additional equitable tolling would be unwarranted.”); United States v. 
Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 352 (1997) (link) (“Section 6511’s detail, its technical language, the iteration 
of the limitations in both procedural and substantive forms, and the explicit listing of exceptions, taken 
together, indicate to us that Congress did not intend courts to read other unmentioned, open-ended, ‘eq-
uitable’ exceptions into the statute that it wrote.”); Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 421 (1996) 
(link) (“There is simply no room in the text of Rules 29 and 45(b) for the granting of an untimely post-
verdict motion for judgment of acquittal, regardless of whether the motion is accompanied by a claim of 
legal innocence, is filed before sentencing, or was filed [one day] late because of attorney error.”); Bank 
of Ala. v. Dalton, 50 U.S. 522 (1850) (link) (interpreting a statute of limitations that includes specified 
exceptions to exclude others). 
51  See Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360, 2365 (2007) (link) (citing precedent).  The precedent usu-
ally calls the deadline “mandatory and jurisdictional,” but, as I have argued above, the best interpretation 
of that phrase is that the cases held the deadline to be “emphatically mandatory.”  Supra text accompa-
nying notes 26–28.  
52  Cf. Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 644 (1992) (link) (“Deadlines may lead to unwel-
come results, but they prompt parties to act and they produce finality.”). 
53  It is possible that the need for equity is greater in the habeas context than in other run-of-the-mill 
civil cases.  Cf. Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 293–94 (1969) (link) (noting the need for some recogni-
tion of the differences between habeas and other civil procedures). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
By my generalized appraisal of the comments, Professor Burch and 
Mr. Poor are on opposite ends, with Professor Dane and I staking out mid-
dle roads that are, in some respects, mirror images of each other.  Whatever 
one thinks of the relative merits of each position, it strikes me that these 
varied approaches suggest that I was right about at least one thing: Bowles 
is a sleeper case54 that deserves more thought and attention.  I look forward 
to continuing the conversation. 
 
 
 
54  Dodson, Jurisdictionality, supra note 2, at 48. 
